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A B S T R A C T   
The rise of the Internet has seen traditional incumbent producers challenged by competition from digital entrant 
platforms. It is unclear, however, how those two types of actors—which are in competition but also mutually 
dependent—can co-exist in the new platform-based ecosystem. This paper sheds light on that pivotal phenom-
enon by connecting the traditional literature on incumbent adaptation with the growing conversation on digital 
platform-based ecosystems. Through a qualitative longitudinal (2005–2019) study of the global digital adver-
tising ecosystem, we examine how incumbent producers pivot between competitive and cooperative strategies in 
response to digital entrant platforms. Our analysis reveals a process characterized by three sequential phases: (1) 
selective cooperation, (2) allied competition, and (3) selective coopetition. Those phases show how switching 
between different multi-level strategies spanning market segments, products, and technological components 
represents a viable solution for incumbent producers adapting in the face of entrant platforms.   
1. Introduction 
Platform-based businesses, such as media, marketplaces, video 
games, and credit cards, increasingly represent an important part of 
modern economies (e.g., Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). Their relevance today has become even more critical with the 
creation of digital platform-based ecosystems following the advent of 
digital giants such as Google, Amazon, and Apple. A “platform-based 
ecosystem” is defined here as a network where a platform owner en-
courages third parties to develop complementary innovations and the 
resulting network of firms manifests significant interdependencies 
(Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; 
Parida, Burström, Visnjic, & Wincent, 2019). In the online space, this 
phenomenon is particularly critical as it leads incumbents into dealing 
with fierce competitors—digital entrant platforms—with whom they 
need to develop complementarities and strategic interdependencies (e. 
g., Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019). One of 
the outcomes in a digital platform-based ecosystem is often that the 
competitive position of the complementors (often independent pro-
ducers) becomes weaker relative to the platform owner controlling the 
ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). The power of Apple over its app 
developers (Yoffie & Rossano, 2012) and that of Amazon over its com-
plementors (Aversa, Haefliger, Hueller, & Reza, 2020; Zhu & Liu, 2018) 
are two notable examples. 
While research on platform-based ecosystems is considerably 
developed in information systems research (e.g., de Reuver, Sorensen, & 
Basole, 2018; Huber, Kude, & Dibbern, 2017; Tiwana, Konsynski, & 
Bush, 2010; Tiwana, 2015) and increasingly so in strategic management 
research (e.g., Adner, 2017; Boudreau, 2010; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; 
Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018), we lack a clear understanding of 
how incumbents that started as non-digital platforms adapt to similar 
ecosystems. That gap is due to the literature on incumbent adaptation to 
technological changes historically studying how traditional incumbents 
(non-platform and non-digital) adapt to non-platform-based radical 
technologies. For example, studies on technological discontinuities 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986) have examined how traditional producers 
of cement, glass, and airplanes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990), but also 
pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Sosa, 2011), have struggled to adapt to 
(non-platform) radical innovations causing competence destruction. 
Similarly, studies on disruptive innovations (Christensen & Bower, 
1996) have tended to consider the disruption of traditional incumbents 
such as steel producers or disk drive manufacturers (Christensen, 1997) 
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or photo camera manufacturers (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) by (non- 
platform) disruptive entrants making products cheaper and more 
accessible. Incumbent adaptation to digital entrant platforms is a rele-
vant problem for practitioners, as shown by leading incumbents failing 
to survive, such as Nokia’s demise when Apple and Google created a new 
digital platform-based ecosystem for mobiles (Vuori & Huy, 2016). Due 
to the theoretical and practical relevance of this gap, we investigate how 
incumbent producers (that are non-digital platforms before the tech-
nological change) can respond to entrant platforms by shifting their 
competitive and cooperative position, and can ultimately adapt to the 
emerging digital platform-based ecosystems. We specifically focus on 
incumbent producers because, of the four main actors in a platform 
ecosystem (platform owners, producers, providers, consumer-
s—according to Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016) incumbent 
producers are key for a platform-based ecosystem as they often experi-
ence issues and frictions when adapting to such new scenarios. 
The few studies related to our focal phenomenon of incumbent 
producers’ adaptation to entrant platforms showed that incumbents 
might need to deploy specific strategies in those new ecosystems. 
Scholars have noted that incumbents often cooperate and compete with 
competitors in the new digital ecosystems (Ansari, Garud, & Kumar-
aswamy, 2016; Cozzolino & Rothaermel, 2018; Cozzolino, Verona, & 
Rothaermel, 2018; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018). The main reason is that 
incumbent producers may need to cooperate with digital entrant plat-
forms to access advanced digital technologies and solutions which can 
be useful, for example, for distributing their products (see the relation-
ship between producers of electronics and Amazon or eBay, hotel chains 
with Booking.com and Expedia, or smartphone producers with Android, 
for example). Yet, entrant platforms usually offer products and services 
which are competitors or substitutes to the incumbents’ offering. That 
means that incumbents start losing market share and see their ability to 
capture value diminish, with the overall effect of pushing them into also 
competing with the entrant platforms. Despite the phenomenon’s 
pervasiveness in modern economies and the rising interest among aca-
demics, we still lack a clear understanding of how those firms jointly 
pivot the cooperative and competitive strategies over time (Hoffmann, 
Lavie, Reuer, & Shipilov, 2018). Developing such insight is a non-trivial 
challenge because competitive responses may span products, technolo-
gies, and market segments. Furthermore, we have scant understanding 
of how traditional (i.e., non-digital) platforms, that is, companies which 
connected diverse consumer groups in a non-digital world, such as a 
media publisher connecting readers and advertisers, compete and 
cooperate with digital entrant platforms (e.g., Google). 
To advance our understanding, we investigate how incumbent pro-
ducers engage with entrant platforms and, over time, adjust their re-
lationships with them as the digital ecosystem evolves. Examining intra- 
and inter-industry coopetition among entrant platforms and incumbent 
producers is of paramount importance, especially because there are still 
numerous industries where, despite the profound digital transformation, 
the impact of digital change has not been sufficiently explored (e.g., 
Nucciarelli et al., 2017). Our paper thus asks: How do incumbent pro-
ducers progressively adapt competitive and cooperative positions in response 
to entrant platforms in increasingly digital ecosystems? 
We investigate that question through a longitudinal study of the 
global digital advertising ecosystem between 2005 and 2019. Within 
that setting, we take the perspective of the incumbent producers (i.e., 
media publishers offering advertising space) and examine their strate-
gies with respect to new entrant platforms (i.e., technological platforms 
commercializing online advertising such as Google and Facebook). Such 
entrant platforms have significantly altered the process of how adver-
tising is traded, and overhauled the structure of the traditional industry, 
by transforming it into a digital platform-based ecosystem. The phe-
nomenon is particularly important because the financial performance of 
incumbent producers has been severely affected by digital entrant 
platforms controlling the new advertising ecosystem (Digiday, 2014; 
The Economist, 2017). 
Our central contribution is the identification of a grounded process 
revealing three sequential phases through which incumbent producers 
embrace the relationship with entrant platforms over time: selective 
cooperation, allied competition, and selective coopetition. By unpacking 
the evolution of those three specific strategies, our study shows that 
incumbent producers’ responses to entrant platforms require a dynamic 
adaptation through different forms of competition and cooperation, 
sometimes also spanning multiple levels (e.g., high-end versus low-end; 
products versus technological components) in the digital ecosystems. 
Overall, this research contributes to multiple literatures, including 
incumbent adaptation, platform-based ecosystems, and competition- 
cooperation. 
2. Theoretical background 
Two major streams of literature have developed separately over the 
years, although the recent digital transformations have seen increasing 
calls for their convergence. The first stream on incumbent adaptation to 
technological changes has examined when and how incumbents struggle 
or adapt to various types of change (e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Cozzolino & Rothaermel, 2018; Henderson & Clark, 1990). The second 
stream on platforms has instead examined the strategies and business 
models of platform-based organizations in industries and ecosystems (e. 
g., Aversa, Hervas-Drane, & Evenou, 2019; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; 
Jacobides et al., 2018; Parida et al., 2019). Each of those research tra-
ditions has developed from different theoretical perspectives. For 
example, incumbent adaptation studies have been conducted by 
scholars concerned with organizational competences (e.g., Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), managerial cognition (e.g., Tripsas & Gavetti, 
2000), and strategic alliances (e.g., Pisano, 1990). Platform studies have 
been conducted in fields such as network economics (e.g., Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003), information systems research (e.g., Huber et al., 2017; 
Tiwana et al., 2010), strategy (e.g., Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Parida 
et al., 2019), and innovation (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Nucciarelli et al., 
2017). 
2.1. Incumbent adaptation to technological changes 
The incumbent adaptation stream has traditionally examined how 
the nature of technological changes affect the competitive advantage of 
incumbents. Incumbents are defined as companies that existed in the 
industry prior to a discontinuous change in technology (Sosa, 2013). The 
term discontinuity refers to a change that is so significant that the im-
provements of the previous technology cannot match the performance of 
the new technology (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). That research stream 
has unveiled important typologies of change, such as competence- 
destroying discontinuities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), architectural 
and modular innovations (Henderson & Clark, 1990), disruptive in-
novations (Christensen & Bower, 1996), complementary-asset discon-
tinuities (Cozzolino & Rothaermel, 2018), and regulatory changes 
(Aversa & Guillotin, 2018). A common finding has been that incumbents 
often fail or struggle after discontinuous changes, with the competitive 
advantage shifting in favor of entrants. Such entrants are defined as 
companies that were not operating in the market before the disconti-
nuity and are often responsible for introducing the discontinuity to the 
market. 
It is important to observe that most of that research stream’s findings 
have emerged by examining industrial settings and technologies that are 
non-platform-based and non-ecosystem-based. For example, common 
technological settings used in this stream have been cement and airlines 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), disk drives (Christensen & Bower, 1996), 
flat-panel displays (Eggers, 2012), typesetters (Tripsas, 1997), and cars 
(Aversa & Guillotin, 2018; Marino, Aversa, Mesquita, & Anand, 2015). 
As none of those settings was platform-based or ecosystem-based, there 
is an opportunity to expand our understanding. It is notable that the 
distinction between traditional industries and platform ecosystems does 
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not merely pertain to a difference of setting or domain. Rather, it in-
volves fundamental aspects which question the nature and outcomes of 
competition. For example, the heterogeneous set of actors involved in 
ecosystems (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018), often spanning mul-
tiple industries, tend to reshape the competition by introducing different 
goals, supply chains, and value propositions. Platforms then introduce 
new mechanisms to the competition—such as increasing returns of 
adoption via indirect network effects (Shipilov & Gawer, 2020)—which 
fuel competition dynamics that are less common in non-platform set-
tings. Despite the increasing importance of platform-based ecosystems, 
the technological change stream provides a far from complete under-
standing of such matters. Our paper thus aims to contribute to this area 
of investigation by assessing how incumbent producers adapt to entrant 
platforms with the emergence of digital platform-based ecosystems. 
That question is also relevant from a practical perspective because most 
of the technological changes occurring today with the advent of the 
Internet are platform- and ecosystem-based. The fact that discontinuity 
is introduced by an entrant platform is a new phenomenon, to which 
incumbents need to react differently. Responding to entrant platforms 
may require adopting different organizational identities (Altman & 
Tripsas, 2015) or business models (Cozzolino et al., 2018). Moreover, it 
might require dynamic use of competitive and cooperative strategies, 
which are the focus of this study. 
2.2. Platform-based ecosystems, competition, and cooperation 
The research stream on platforms and ecosystems has examined the 
strategies and business model configurations of platform companies and 
the interconnected systems around them (see Shipilov & Gawer, 2020 
for a review). In our paper, a platform is an entity that enables trans-
actions between multiple actors in the presence of network external-
ities—a condition where the marginal value of a part increases with the 
addition of other parts. Network economists and information systems 
researchers have explained that the business model adopted by plat-
forms is often that of matching two or more markets (namely, two-sided 
or multiple-sided platforms) with the aim of internalizing the network 
externalities within and across markets (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003). The examined research stream, especially from 
the strategy and information systems perspectives, has shown that 
platforms often become prominent players in industries as a conse-
quence of their role as orchestrators of multiple parties (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2008; Parida et al., 2019; Tiwana, 2015). The industries 
where platforms become central actors tend to assume the form of 
business ecosystems. In general, a business ecosystem is a space of 
mutual complementarities and interdependencies where a focal firm 
operates, and it usually includes suppliers, customers, competitors, and 
complementors from various industries (e.g., Adner & Kapoor, 2010; 
Moore, 1993). 
A platform-based business ecosystem, in particular, is a business 
ecosystem where the central actor is a platform, so it is characterized by 
network externalities and platform strategies (e.g., Iansiti & Levien, 
2004; Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016). According to Van 
Alstyne et al. (2016, p.4), a platform-based ecosystem comprises four 
players: the platform owner controlling intellectual property and gover-
nance, the providers acting as the platform’s interfaces with users, the 
producers creating the offers, and the consumers adopting the products 
and services. That basic structure is useful for our paper because our 
research question pertains precisely to how incumbent producers deal 
with platform owners in an emerging ecosystem. When such a platform- 
based ecosystem is mostly based on internet-based and/or data-driven 
technologies, it can be considered “digital” (i.e., a digital platform- 
based ecosystem; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Nambisan & Baron, 
2019). 
That research stream has also shown cooperation and competition to 
be critical aspects of platform ecosystems. As Adner (2017, p. 40) sug-
gests, an ecosystem has a “multilateral set of partners that need to 
interact in order for a focal value proposition to materialize.” That 
suggests the need for cooperation with and among several providers and 
producers to create value. The platform owner is often pressured to work 
collectively with a set of complementors to have them develop com-
plementary innovations that synergically increase the overall value of its 
platform, as well as that of its partners (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). 
Gawer (2014) also indicates that, as an industry ecosystem emerges, 
cooperative innovations occur on a platform, with concurrent compe-
tition increases from complementors desiring to create their proprietary 
platforms. Similarly, ecosystem members can cooperate to create value 
jointly, but also attempt to become platforms and compete (Cowen & 
Gawer, 2012). Platforms need to balance carefully business and tech-
nology decisions, as entering complementors’ markets can hinder 
complementors’ motivation to innovate, thereby resulting in “excessive” 
competition (Zhu & Liu, 2018). Therefore, the governance of platforms 
is a key issue (Huber et al., 2017), as they need to control which features 
to compete on while allowing other players to create complementary 
features that increase platform functionality and value (Parker & Van 
Alstyne, 2018). 
2.3. Remaining theoretical gaps at the intersection of incumbent 
adaptation and platform ecosystems 
The literature on incumbent adaptation to technological changes and 
the platform ecosystem research streams have advanced important and 
insightful contributions, but they have clearly adopted different per-
spectives and examined somewhat different phenomena. On the one 
hand, the incumbent adaptation stream has taken the perspective of 
established (non-platform) organizations while mostly neglecting the 
consideration of entrant platforms and digital platform-based ecosys-
tems. Hence, we aim to extend the study of incumbent adaptation to the 
phenomenon of platform-based discontinuities/disruptions. On the 
other hand, the platform ecosystem stream has taken the platform owner 
perspective, although ecosystem development also requires considering 
the perspective of incumbent producers as complementors. Therefore, 
we aim to extend the understanding of platform-based ecosystems 
beyond the platform owner perspective by integrating the view of 
incumbent producers. 
Given that competition and cooperation in platform-based ecosys-
tems is crucial, we can expect that non-platform incumbents also need to 
cooperate and compete in similar digital ecosystems. However, we 
ignore the specifics of how that can unfold. Understanding that problem 
is important because the literature has recently called for contributions 
to shed light on this phenomenon (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 
2018). Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018) have started to conceptualize 
competition and cooperation between incumbents and new entrants 
when technological discontinuities destroy incumbents’ complementary 
assets (i.e., manufacturing, distribution, and sales). Digital distributive 
platforms represent new complementary assets for incumbent producers 
such as movie and music producers and publishers to commercialize 
their products online. Those authors suggest that, when a discontinuity 
introduces new complementary assets, incumbents can cooperate 
among themselves against the entrants which own the new comple-
mentary assets to avoid excessive expropriation of value by those en-
trants, especially when the appropriability regime is weak.1 When the 
appropriability regime is strong, incumbents may afford a higher degree 
of cooperation with those entrants because the incumbents’ intellectual 
property is protected by the stronger regime. Incumbents might also use 
cooperation among themselves to increase their collective bargaining 
1 Teece (1986, 1989, 2018) originally introduced the concept of appropri-
ability regimes to refer to the legal and non-legal mechanisms that permit in-
tellectual property protection. The author also introduced the concept of 
complementary assets as those assets allowing the commercialization of prod-
ucts, thus practically enabling value capture. 
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power against entrants. Hannah and Eisenhardt (2018) complement this 
view by pointing out that competition and cooperation dynamics in 
emerging ecosystems depend on bottleneck crowdedness. Further, 
Padula and Dagnino (2007) explain that a high environmental uncer-
tainty and distance in the knowledge profile generates competitive 
tensions within a cooperative context. Similar competitive tensions have 
been observed in the case of incumbent producers commercializing their 
products through Amazon’s online platform (Aversa et al., 2020). 
Among others, Hoffmann et al. (2018) call for additional research on the 
evolution of competition and cooperation from different contexts, and 
our study is aimed at responding to that call from the overlooked 
perspective of incumbent producers adapting to entrant platforms in 
digital platform-based ecosystems. 
3. Methods 
We conducted an inductive longitudinal study on the evolution of the 
digital advertising ecosystem with particular attention to the interplay 
between incumbent producers (traditional publishers commercializing 
advertising space on their media websites) and entrant platforms 
(technological entrants trading digital advertising). The extensive use of 
archival data is particularly suitable when the goal is to provide a 
contextualized explanation and interpretation of the phenomenon under 
study by leveraging the historical contextual conditions as a key 
component of the empirical analysis (see reflections in Argyres et al., 
2020). We selected the advertising industry because, despite being a 
long-established industry, it has been radically overhauled by digital 
technologies such as the Internet, big data analytics, portable devices, 
and social media (Athey & Gans, 2010; Cozzolino et al., 2018; Lanzolla 
& Giudici, 2017; Simmons, Palmer, & Truong, 2013). The way modern 
advertising is transacted, sold, and purchased is radically different from 
the approach at its inception in the 17th century and, indeed, the early 
19th century, when it underwent massive growth in conjunction with 
the development of the modern printing industry. More recent radical 
shifts, which are mostly due to digital transformation, make the industry 
a digital platform-based ecosystem, and thus an ideal setting for a 
response to our research question. 
Before the advent of the Internet, the advertising industry was 
comprised of actors such as traditional incumbent producers (i.e., media 
owners), including newspapers, radio, television (operating as sellers of 
advertising space), advertisers, agencies representing advertisers 
(operating as buyers of advertising space), and firms measuring and 
rating the audience (e.g., Nielsen Media Research, the Audit Bureau of 
Circulation). The Internet has challenged the incumbent producers’ 
competitive advantage by becoming an alternative medium for effective 
advertising, in which entrant platforms enable personalized and 
performance-based advertising (Bergemann & Bonatti, 2011). Online 
advertising has resulted in the creation of a new ecosystem incorpo-
rating existing and new actors, such as advertisers, agencies, the new 
entrant platforms, including the ad networks and exchanges which are 
the main focus of our analysis but also trading desks, demand-side 
platforms, supply-side platforms, and incumbent publishers (Fig. 1 
provides a simplified representation of the digital advertising 
ecosystem). 
During the evolution of the new digital ecosystem, new entrant 
platforms trading advertising spaces emerged, while incumbent pro-
ducers responded through competitive and cooperative strategies. The 
study of that pivotal transformation has allowed us to identify a general 
process through which both incumbent producers and entrant platforms 
compete and cooperate in an emerging digital ecosystem. 
3.1. Data sources 
Our research is based on an extensive collection of archival and 
interview data. Given the retrospective and longitudinal nature of our 
study, which covers a relatively significant span of years (2005–2019), 
archival data were used as the main source of information. The use of 
secondary archival data presents several advantages for research. First, 
published records in the form of archival data represent more factual 
and objective sources of information than primary sources such as in-
terviews, which might be more subject to the risk of ex-post ration-
alization by key informants (e.g., Vuori & Huy, 2016). A second 
advantage is that archival data provide better and richer contextual 
information on the period observed than interview data (e.g., Galvin, 
Burton, & Nyuur, 2020). Accordingly, archival data are viable sources 
for empirical analysis and have been employed widely in management 
research (e.g., Cattani, Ferriani, & Lanza, 2017; Galvin et al., 2020). The 
archival data collection process involved the examination of the digital 
advertising industry through publicly available resources between 2005 
(the introduction of the first disruptive platform entrant) and 2019. We 
began our search by inspecting specialist media outlets such as Ad Age, 
Adweek, and Digiday. Advertising and media professionals consider those 
sources to be the most reliable and established. Our search criterion 
included industry- and phenomenon-related keywords such as “audi-
ence buying,” “ad networks,” “ad exchanges,” “private marketplaces,” 
“digital media,” “ad tech vendors,” and “inventory.” We integrated the 
information obtained from those sources with videos and reports ob-
tained from specialist conferences and the Interactive Advertising Bu-
reau (IAB). 
In addition to the specialist data sources, we collected archival data 
from the generalist press. Each author undertook independent data 
collection, with the final results combined and discussed within the 
research team. We scanned the Lexis-Nexis database for articles between 
the years 2000 and 2019. We used different combinations of key terms 
such as “advertising,” “remnant,” “programmatic,” “bidding,” “pub-
lisher,” and “alliance” as the main keywords and initially retained all 
documents mentioning at least one keyword. For example, an initial 
search of “advertising,” “programmatic,” and “publisher” yielded 403 
results. However, in order to take into account more recent industry 
developments, we added keywords such as “bidding” or “alliance” in a 
nested fashion to generate 129 and 28 results, respectively. While the 
search included significant international publications such as the 
Financial Times and The New York Times, other English language publi-
cations from outside the United Kingdom and the United States were 
Ad Exchange















(e.g., P&G) End user
Supply-side Demand-side 
Fig. 1. The digital advertising ecosystem.  
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also taken into account. From that list, we selected articles related to the 
effects of advertising industry digitalization, the role of new entrants in 
shaping that industry, and the reactions of advertisers and publishers. 
We also collected academic articles on the topic, primarily within the 
marketing field, to understand further the various technologies and 
models for the algorithmic exchange of advertisements online. Such 
publications often dealt with new pricing models (pay-per-exposure and 
pay-per-action), targeting methods, the role of news aggregators such as 
Google and Facebook, and their economic impact on publishers’ 
advertising revenues. In line with recent qualitative research mostly 
based on archival data (e.g., Aversa & Guillotin, 2018), the initial body 
of documents was skimmed for relevance, information and source reli-
ability, and repetition. That process ultimately led to a final selection of 
63 documents with a total of 469 single-spaced pages of relevant text. 
In addition to the archival sources, ten explorative semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with industry experts and executives from 
both incumbent producers and entrant platforms (Corbetta, 2003). The 
primary and secondary data collection was terminated once it reached 
“theoretical saturation” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which corresponds to 
the scholars realizing that additional data no longer spark new theo-
retical insights nor reveal new properties of the theoretical categories 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 113). To identify our interviewees, we initially relied 
on personal industry contacts of an author who had previously worked 
in a media company. We then expanded through a snowball technique 
via interviewees’ referrals, as well as through independent LinkedIn 
searches. To provide consistency in interview style and protocol, only 
one of the authors conducted the interviews. Interviews were open- 
ended (e.g., Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 
2020) and aimed at understanding the key events shaping a new 
ecosystem and incumbent-entrant dynamics. Each interview opened 
with the interviewer broadly inquiring about the interviewee’s back-
ground, then their company’s business and core competencies. 
The second part of the interview consisted of open questions about 
more specific topics such as the evolution of advertising and the role of 
incumbent producers’ reactions to entrant platforms. Notes were taken 
during and after the interviews. To ensure reliability, multiple re-
searchers analyzed the interviews independently, with discrepancies 
and agreements in the individual coding being discussed. Interviews 
lasted from 45 to 120 minutes, were transcribed verbatim, and then 
checked for accuracy. Overall, we collected 12 hours of personal inter-
view material. The combination of a large quantity of archival data from 
a variety of sources and interviews with key industry experts enabled us 
to triangulate our data and develop our framework (Neuman, 2003). 
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of our data sources. 
3.2. Data analysis 
Given the novelty of the observed phenomenon, we started by con-
structing a chronology of events illustrating the evolution of the 
advertising market and the emergence of a digital ecosystem since 2005 
(see Fig. 2). The presented timeline helps to illustrate the three phases 
where each period is demarcated by distinct patterns of collaboration 
and competition among incumbents and entrants that are observable in 
a fairly stable and linear manner (Langley, 1999). We tracked how 
digital advertising was purchased and sold over time, identifying major 
transitions and industry players in the digital advertising landscape (e. 
g., advertisers, media agencies, newspaper publishers, and ad tech 
companies). 
We then focused on identifying the mechanisms behind the 
ecosystem evolution and the challenges incumbents faced with each 
technological advancement. To conduct a more fine-grained analysis, 
we continuously compared data from various sources with our emerging 
theoretical insights (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The analysis followed the 
general principles of grounded theory (Locke, 2001), with our coding 
procedure generating first-order concepts, second-order themes, and 
aggregate dimensions (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2004). To organize the 
material, we adopted a manual coding procedure, which gives re-
searchers “more control over and ownership of the work” (Saldaña, 
2015, p. 26). We also followed a “temporal bracketing” procedure 
(Langley, 1999) to identify a longitudinal, theoretically relevant, pro-
cess. As with every qualitative study, our analyses were dynamic and 
iterative—often referring back to data and theory to validate our 
findings. 
Step 1: Creating first-order concepts. Each author conducted an 
analysis of the interview and archival material to identify the key 
emerging themes, discuss them, and agree on representative labels. 
Open codes in our data included statements concerning incumbent 
producers recognizing “reach and efficiency as selling points” of ad- 
network platforms, incumbent producers competing against entrant 
platforms by “getting together and making an alliance”, and incumbent 
producers partnering with entrant platforms to “more effectively and 
efficiently manage and evaluate data.” Redundancies were consolidated, 
with the codes gradually forming fifteen first-order categories (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 
Step 2: Progressing toward second-order themes. Next, we 
gradually progressed toward theory-driven explanations (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) by searching for links between the fifteen first-order 
concepts to facilitate grouping them together into seven abstract 
second-order categories. Following the Van Maanen (1979) approach, 
one of the scholars tried to challenge the interpretation of the second- 
order themes to improve theorizing. Coding and interpretations which 
did not find agreement across the coders were ultimately discarded. 
Step 3: Generating aggregate dimensions. This final step entailed 
aggregating similar themes into three overarching dimensions, which 
Table 1 
Data sources.  
Data 
Sources 
Type of data Use in the analysis 
Interview 
data 
10 Interviews conducted with 
industry executives and subject 
experts (12 h duration, 21 pages 
of transcripts) 
Gathering insights on the effect 
of technological disruption on 
the advertising industry as well 
as the drivers of cooperation and 
competition between incumbent 
publishers and new entrants 
Archival 
data 
Videos downloaded from the 
internet 
2 Interactive Advertising 
Bureau (IAB) videos about the 
evolution of online display 
advertising 
Journal articles 
7 articles covering the period 
2008–2012 (160 pages) 
Press coverage 
50 articles covering the period 
2005–2019 (133 pages) 
Reports 
6 reports covering the period 
2011–2017 (174 pages). 
Gaining an initial understanding 
of the online advertising buying 
process (e.g., how the audience 
buying evolved from traditional 
buying towards sophisticated 
programmatic buying)  
Developing knowledge about the 
key elements involved in 
advertising such as pay-per- 
exposure, pay-per-action, 
targeting, and re-targeting. 
Further understanding the role of 
aggregators in the news and 
advertising industry and the 
threats and opportunities they 
pose for publishers 
Expanding the factual 
information about the phases 
involved in buying and selling of 
ad spaces. Better understanding 
the emergence of each, their 
respective workflow, and the 
type of ad space (remnant/ 
premium)  
Enhancing the validity of 
insights, better understanding 
the phenomena of advertising 
and audience buying from the 
scope of industry experts and 
where it is headed 
Total 73(+2) documents (490 pages 
ca.)   
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provided the basis of our three-step process model. We searched for 
dimensions underlying those themes in an attempt to understand how 
different themes fitted together into a coherent picture. To establish the 
reliability of our findings (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), we also drew 
on the literature, specifically studies about coopetition and ecosystems, 
to refine our labels and ensure the most robust findings. Fig. 3 presents 
the final data structure resulting from our coding procedure. 
Temporal bracketing and process development. Once the coding 
procedure had been completed, we tried to investigate our final set of 
codes in order to identify the relationships between them and an un-
derlying temporal and logical sequence. First, we placed the second- 
order categories on the timeline and tried to understand to which 
phase they belonged. We used our primary and secondary data to 
triangulate our intuitions. Second, we looked at the relationship be-
tween the codes and tried to identify the underlying relations between 
them. We divided the connections between second-order categories into 
“consequences” and “feedback loops.” Ultimately, we used that complex 
set of considerations to derive a process model which closely follows the 
logical sequence of events in the observed phenomenon. We present our 
findings in the following section. The narrative of the events follows the 
relationships between the second-order categories depicted in the pro-
cess model, while the three aggregate dimensions identify the three 
main phases of the process. In line with Berends and Deken (2019), we 
present our findings through an “inductive composition,” where the 
narrative of the events adopts the constitutive elements derived from the 
coding, with a final three-phase model presented at the end of the 
narrative as emerging from the grounded evidence. 
4. Findings 
This section details the initial cooperative relationships between 
incumbent producers and entrant platforms at the low end of the market 
(phase 1), incumbents’ subsequent competitive reaction to the pro-
prietary commercialization of their high-end products (phase 2), and 
finally incumbents’ adoption of entrants’ technological solutions once 
the ecosystem had been consolidated (phase 3). Table 2 shows addi-
tional supporting data for readers interested in integrating the evidence 
provided in the paragraphs below. 
4.1. Phase 1: Selective cooperation 
This first phase portrays an environment in which digital entrants 
create new distribution platforms and incumbent producers initially 
cooperate with them for the commercialization of their low-end prod-
ucts (i.e., advertising with inferior market value). We find that incum-
bent producers experienced challenges from the entrant platforms’ lack 
of transparency and aggressive pricing, leading the former to limit their 
cooperation to where the entrant platforms’ services were most needed 
(i.e., low-end products). Therefore, the first strategy we observe is se-
lective cooperation between incumbent producers and entrant 
platforms. 
This first phase broadly corresponds to the beginning of the media 
industry digitalization. When traditional media (i.e., incumbent pro-
ducers) transferred their original products online in the early 2000s, 
they found themselves competing against each other in the same tradi-
tional environment (e.g., newspapers, magazines, and TV stations) while 
engaging online with digitally-born producers (e.g., portals and blogs), 
which also ran advertising-based business models. As a result of the 
increasing competition in advertising, all the incumbent producers 
ended up with large volumes of unsold advertising space. On the supply 
side of the ecosystem, the main challenge was that incumbent producers 
needed to monetize their vast (and mostly unsold) online advertising 
space, which was termed “remnant inventory.”2 On the demand side, the 
main challenge was for advertisers to find effective ways to purchase 
different advertising spaces from a large number of incumbent 
Ad networks fully operational 
helping advertisers place their ads
Double Click develops the first ad 
exchange using RTB (2006)
Entrant 
platforms
First DSPs appear to make 
advertisers’ operations more 
efficient
First SSPs appear used by 
publishers to facilitate RTB 
(2007)
Publishers collaborate with ad 
tech firms to create closed 
marketplaces
New entrants such as Facebook 
and Google create open ad 
exchanges to consolidate their 
presence
phase 1: 2005-2011  phase 2: 2011-2014  phase 3: 2014-2019  
Incumbent
producers
Growing presence of publishers 
on the web
Publishers invest in premium 
programmatic ad solutions
Premium publishers create 
private marketplaces
Publishers use data 
management platforms to 
Publishers form alliances to 
create a premium programmatic 
marketplace to address a larger 
audience and compete with large 
entrants  
Fig. 2. The digital advertising ecosystem after its digital transformation.  
2 Remnant inventory can be defined as an ad space on the publisher’s website 
that the publisher has been unable to sell and is being sold at a lower cost 
(Kantar, 2014). 
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producers’ web pages. 
By 2005, technologically-advanced entrants on the advertising 
market had started to provide solutions to those challenges by creating 
the first advertising platforms called “ad networks” (Digiday, 2014). An 
ad network is a company that acts as an aggregating marketplace that 
buys the unsold remnant inventory from multiple websites, aggregates it 
depending on the target audiences, and sells it to individual advertisers 
or advertising agencies (e.g., WPP or Omnicom Group). Early examples 
of ad networks were 24/7 Media, AdWords (developed by Google), 
DoubleClick (acquired by Google in 2008), and Bing Ads (developed by 
Microsoft). Both major and smaller incumbent producers initially 
cooperated with such entrant platforms to sell their non-premium 
remnant inventory (their low-end products). Instead, the premium 
(high-end) advertising spaces were still sold only through producers’ 
proprietary sales forces at higher prices. The synergies in the initial 
cooperation between incumbent producers and entrant platforms (ad 
networks) were confirmed by Jeff Webber, the publisher of USA Today: 
If we sold every scrap of inventory, we wouldn’t use ad networks, but 
right now it makes some sense for us. (The New York Times, 2008) 
Such platforms thus helped advertisers to extend their reach by 
combining the inventory from hundreds of individual media producers 
and categorizing them so that ads could better target specific audiences 
(Kammer & Matheson, 2015). The successful rise of ad networks and the 
value of this innovation in terms of advertiser efficiency and reach was 
acknowledged by various industry analysts and experts.3 On that point, 
Forbes CEO Jim Spanfeller further noted: 
With a single insertion order and a single bill [via an ad network], we 
[publishers] allow advertisers access to more than 500 blogs that we 
have determined are reasonably well lit and good places for advertising 
to exist. (Griffin, 2008) 
Despite the growth they supported with their technologies and 
despite being initially welcomed by incumbent producers, entrant 
platforms (i.e., ad networks) soon came into conflict with large incum-
bent producers. A first challenge emerged from ad networks often black- 
boxing incumbent producers with which they had contractual arrange-
ments (Benes, 2017a). They lacked transparency and displayed 
misleading descriptions, such as “approved publishers” or “preferred 
publishers,” without ever revealing the actual list of publishers to the 
buyers where their ads appeared (Pere, 2012). In some cases, adver-
tisers’ ads almost never appeared on most preferred incumbent pro-
ducers, such as The Economist, as such producers did not have any 
agreements with third-party ad networks. Ad networks were able to 
maintain such practices for a long period of time, by repackaging and 
reselling the inventory they claimed belonged to premium incumbent 
producers, despite not having any agreements in place with such high- 
end actors. 
Another issue was the low inventory price at which entrant platforms 
were reselling incumbent producers’ advertising spaces (Kammer & 
Matheson, 2015). Further, as more entrant platforms appeared over 
time, they started cross-selling inventories among themselves, thereby 
reducing incumbent producers’ profits (Kammer & Matheson, 2015). A 
media technology company executive we interviewed summarized the 
challenges as follows: 
It’s a big mess, [ad networks] have bought the unsold spaces, saying 
“anyway you [publishers] don’t need them,” and they repackaged them 
for premium advertisers, and kept the extra margins for themselves 
instead of sharing them with publishers. 
The identified challenges refer to a moral hazard problem (Grossman 
& Hart, 1992) created by entrant platforms at the expense of incumbent 
1. Incumbent producers cooperating with digital entrant platforms (ad-networks) to sell low-end products
2. Incumbent producers improving their market reach for low-end products via entrant platforms (ad-
networks)
3. Incumbent producers’ improving targeting via entrant platforms (ad-exchanges) 
4. Entrant platforms (ad-networks) decreasing transparency with incumbent producers
5. Entrant platforms (ad-networks) reducing incumbent producers’ margins via cross-selling
6. Incumbent producers facing the challenge of lower prices (ad-exchanges)
7. Incumbent producers losing control over pricing against entrant platforms (ad-exchanges)
8. Incumbent producers maintaining control over high-end products 
9. Incumbent producers cooperating to jointly develop platform technologies to sell high-end products
10. Incumbent producers innovating high-end sales via automation
11. Incumbent producers combining the entrant platforms’ (ad-exchanges) efficiency and safety of 
proprietary solutions
12. Incumbent producers facing technical issues requiring manual intervention
13. Incumbent producers lacking technical expertise
14. Incumbent producers using entrant platforms’ advert technologies that have become standards in the 
ecosystem
15. Incumbent producers continuing to develop platform technologies to sell high-end products 
i. Cooperation between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
low-end of the market
iii. Cooperation between competing 
incumbent producers at the high-end of 
the market
vii. Competition between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
product level 
vi. Cooperation between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
component level
ii. Frictions between incumbent producers 
and entrant platforms
(moral hazard and loss of control) 
v. Technical limitations and lack of 
expertise of incumbent producers
iv. Competition between incumbent 








Fig. 3. Final data structure.  
3 According to the “2007 Ad Network Study” conducted by Collective Media, 
77% of agencies in the USA used ad networks to purchase online media in 2006. 
Moreover, 52% of respondents in their survey highlighted reach, 66% effi-
ciency, and 77% targeting, as the main reasons for using ad networks for digital 
media buying (Anfuso, 2007). 
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producers—an issue that was clearly identifiable at least in the initial 
stage of the ecosystem’s digital transformation. As a result, incumbent 
producers did not embrace entrant platforms (ad networks) in a stable 
manner due to frictions related to transparency and price. The manager 
of a large Italian media company that we interviewed explained the 
shortcomings of entrant platforms: 
If you try to call Google, you will not get anyone responding. They 
send you a standardized monthly report with your revenues, but you 
cannot ask specific questions! 
Interestingly, we found that platforms dynamically adapted to in-
cumbents’ concerns by improving their offers. To solve the transparency 
problem, entrant platforms developed and introduced a more advanced 
technological solution—“ad exchanges.” While the transaction through 
the ad network occurred via agents and manual workflow, the new ad 
exchanges offered digital, machine-automated media buying, giving 
birth to what the industry defined as “programmatic media buying” 
(Adweek, 2013). The progression toward a digital and more 
technologically-advanced solution was explained by an executive 
Table 2 
Data supporting the emerged themes.  
Second-order themes Representative quotes 
Cooperation between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
low-end of the market  
• “I believe reach and efficiency are 
definitely two of the selling points for 
(ad) networks in general” (Tom Hespos, 
CEO of Underscore Marketing, quoted in 
Anfuso, 2007)  
• “By bringing publishers and advertisers 
together in an open marketplace in which 
prices are set in a real-time auction, the 
Ad Exchange enables display ads and ad 
space to be allocated much more effi-
ciently. This improves returns for adver-
tisers and enables publishers to get the 
most value out of their online content” 
(Neal Mohan, VP of product manage-
ment, quoted in Clifford-Marsh, 2009)  
• “Ten years ago you would never have had 
the information technology cheap 
enough to do these transactions” (Mike 
Driscoll, Head of Metamarkets, quoted in 
The Economist, 2014b) 
Frictions between incumbent producers 
and entrant platforms (moral hazard 
and loss of control)  
• “Real-time bidding has “hammered” 
many upmarket publishers by reducing 
their prices” (Henry Blodget, CEO of 
Business Insider and Editor-in-Chief, 
quoted in The Economist, 2014a)  
• “This has been an industry issue for some 
time, dating back before the advent of 
SSPs” (Jeffrey Hirsch, CMO of PubMatic, 
quoted in Benes, 2017a)  
• “What matters the most is that they [ad- 
networks] get their [ad] impressions. As 
long as the traffic is real and the ads are 
being served to real people, it’s never a 
problem” (Marc Goldberg, CEO of Trust 
Metrics, quoted in Silverman, Singer- 
Vine, & Vo, 2017)  
• “GroupM is pushing towards RTB, Google 
is doing the same, everybody says ‘Oh my 
God I have to do the same too!’ but they 
[producers] don’t really know what it is 
about, they get fooled” (Interviewed 
anonymous industry executive) 
Cooperation between competing 
incumbent producers at the high-end 
of the market  
• “There’s definitely a push to create more 
premium tiers of inventory. Publishers 
want to create those prestige brands 
[PMPs] because it’s a path to secure 
audience and more money” (Paul 
Bannister, Executive VP of Café Media, 
quoted in Digiday, 2017)  
• “PMPs arose during a time where it was 
the early days of programmatic, when ad 
quality and fraud were less effectively 
regulated in the open auction” (Ashley 
Wheeler, VP seller and accounts of 
Rubicon Project, quoted in Beeler, 2018) 
Competition between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms  
• “Publishers including The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal and Time 
have set up private ad exchanges as a way 
to dip their toes into automation. More 
recently publishers have begun to 
automate their direct dealings with 
advertisers. Under these “programmatic 
direct” deals, a publisher’s sales rep may 
negotiate an arrangement with an 
advertiser that includes top-tier in-
ventory like home-page-takeover ads at a 
fixed price for a guaranteed number of 
impressions” (APEX’s CEO, quoted in 
Chambers, 2015)  
• “[Through PPMPs] Advertisers can reach 
audiences programmatically in real-time 
… [giving them] the scale and effi-
ciencies of an open exchange with the  
Table 2 (continued ) 
Second-order themes Representative quotes 
safety of a private exchange” (APEX’s 
CEO, quoted in Chambers, 2015) 
Technical limitations and lack of 
expertise of incumbent producers  
• “When it works, it’s beautiful. We’re not 
exchanging insertion orders or amending 
them seven times a month. It’s far 
superior to how traditional deals are 
done online. But we’re not bulletproof 
yet as an industry.” (Pete Spande, Chief 
Revenue Officer of Business Insider, 
quoted in Bilton, 2014)  
• “We should be able to trade every single 
piece of inventory dynamically and we 
can’t. That’s one thing we need to invest 
in.” (Hamish Nicklin, Chief Revenue 
Officer of Guardian, quoted in Gibson, 
2019) 
Cooperation between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
component level  
• “Today we are plugged in Google’s 
advertising tools because part of the flow 
passes through them.” (Interviewed 
executive from the advertising subsidiary 
of the newspaper La Repubblica)  
• “That’s why we broke away from the 
traditional constraints of ad servers and 
SSPs to build new programmatic 
solutions directly into the product we 
now call Ad Manager … [with features] 
that help you maximize yield across 
reservations, private marketplaces, and 
the open auction” (Jonathan Bellack, 
Director of product management for 
publisher ad platforms of Google, quoted 
in Marvin, 2016) 
Competition between incumbent 
producers and entrant platforms at the 
product level  
• “We are working together to build a 
better digital ecosystem for advertisers, 
readers and publishers. The Ozone 
Project is a response to the challenges we 
all face and aims to facilitate the highest 
standard of digital advertising and ensure 
quality journalism and content continues 
to be funded.” (Hamish Nicklin, Chief 
Revenue Officer of GNM, quoted in The 
Guardian, 2018)  
• “The best thing for us to do to compete 
[against the major tech platforms] was to 
get together and make an alliance, a 
collaborative project where you bring 
together all these old-school companies, 
all of them have TV stations, newspapers 
or radio, and build a platform where we 
could address advertising, and probably 
in the future, a paid-content wall.” 
(Nonio’s steering committee member, 
quoted in Veseling, 2019)  
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working at an ad-tech network: 
Today we are in a context where not only publishers have a strong 
identity crisis but also those who were working as simple aggregators on 
a manual basis of publishers’ inventory, let’s say the ad networks, 
haven’t been able to evolve into a technological platform, and today 
they are in crisis, so much that almost all pure ad networks have dis-
appeared and transformed in something new. 
Ad exchanges allowed publishers and advertisers to buy and sell 
advertising space such as impressions through real-time auctions (The 
Guardian, 2015). Sellers made their audiences available on the platform, 
while buyers selected a specific audience and bid for it (Interactive 
Advertising Bureau, 2012). By doing so, the winner could basically 
expose the audience to the right ad, at the right time. Advertisers used 
additional demand-side platforms to connect to an ad exchange, while 
publishers made their inventory available through supply-side platforms 
which allowed them to connect to multiple ad exchanges. Hence, the rise 
of the ad exchange entrant platform—a system that still works 
today—was an important milestone in the emergence of a more complex 
ecosystem for digital advertising. Examples of successful ad exchanges 
are Right Media by Yahoo, DoubleClick by Google, and OpenX. The real- 
time automation and efficiency of the new entrant platforms (ad ex-
changes) attracted incumbent producers’ cooperation, as confirmed by 
Rajeev Goel, founder of PubMatic: 
Using data, programmatic advertising can be much more targeted 
and relevant. If you’re a publisher, we can, within 100 ms, sell space on 
your website to thousands of different advertisers. (The Business Times, 
2014) 
The efficiency mechanism was also confirmed by The Economist 
(2014a), which mentioned that ad exchanges made it easier and less 
costly for advertisers to discover specific audiences, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of the once vital aggregation role of ad networks. 
However, tensions emerged regarding the lower revenues per 
impression and the incumbent producers losing control over pricing 
(The Economist, 2014b). The growth in programmatic buying in fact led 
to a decrease in advertising prices, since advertising spaces were sold 
more cheaply on ad exchanges, causing a reduction in margins for 
incumbent producers, as noted by Brendan Hughes, the Chief Digital 
Officer at Independent News and Media (INM): 
In some cases, for every euro spent by company advertising on its 
online platforms only 0.40 (Euro cents) goes to INM. The rest falls into a 
black hole. (The Times, 2017) 
Interestingly, even in the case of ad exchanges, upmarket incumbent 
producers gradually diverted from cooperating with those digital 
entrant platforms because they felt threatened by a price reduction in 
their premium ads. 
At the same time, automation also led to an abundance of what was 
considered “toxic” or “random” inventory, either because it came from 
obscure providers, or because it constituted odd advertising which was 
systematically relegated to peripheral areas (e.g., the very bottom of 
web pages) of premium incumbent producers’ websites, thus commod-
itizing media buying (Gold, 2007; Shields, 2011). Karpinski (2010) also 
mentions that challenge and points out that entrant platforms (ad ex-
changes) provided the opportunity to monetize the unsold inventory, 
but lowered the cost per impression and decreased brand value—a major 
threat for elite incumbent producers. Speaking about the commoditi-
zation of digital media and the increasing competitive pressure exerted 
by ad exchanges, David Pemsel, CEO of The Guardian, stated: 
There are some pretty terrible practices within the programmatic 
advertising space, and it is unclear how much money is lost in the flow 
between the client paying for an ad and the news outlet that has created 
the audience (Financial Times, 2019). 
In sum, in phase 1, we noticed that incumbent producers initially 
cooperate with new distributive platforms to commercialize their low- 
end products (especially if unsold otherwise), but such cooperation 
can expose an incumbent producer to frictions related to moral hazard 
(e.g., lack of transparency) and loss of control (e.g., lower pricing). 
4.2. Phase 2: Allied competition 
The second phase depicts an environment in which incumbent pro-
ducers start competing with entrant platforms after realizing, in phase 1, 
the possible downsides of cooperating with them. Our data show that 
incumbent producers in phase 2 compete with entrant platforms to 
defend their more valuable high-end products and ally among them-
selves to develop proprietary platforms. The dynamic in phase 2 is one of 
allied competition. It takes place because all incumbent producers can 
envision, by phase 2, that the challenges experienced in phase 1 with 
their low-end products could affect over time their high-end premium 
market. 
Around 2011, the lack of transparency and price commoditization 
challenges faced with entrant platforms induced incumbent producers to 
start competing with entrant platforms by creating their own private 
marketplaces for high-end advertising products. Large incumbent pro-
ducers such as The New York Times Company, Condè Nast, Tribune 
Media, and Gannett, and technology providers such as MediaMath 
engaged in the formation of private marketplaces through which to sell 
their ads (Digiday, 2017). At the very beginning, those were manually- 
operated, but were soon upgraded into programmatic technologies. 
Such private marketplaces were closed ad exchanges, resembling an 
exclusive “by-invitation-only” circle created by single incumbent pro-
ducers, through alliances with technology partners, to sell their pre-
mium inventory at higher prices while providing superior quality 
assurance (Chen, 2017).4 When asked about the drivers behind the 
formation of private marketplaces, a media technology industry execu-
tive we interviewed observed that: 
Now we are seeing the birth of restricted SSPs (supply-side plat-
forms), the private exchange, which is the premium’s answer to the 
aggregation of the long tail (…) Premium publishers don’t want to enter 
the open market because they don’t want to lose control over prices, 
volumes and advertisers (…) In reality, publishers said: I don’t want to 
give my inventory to Google, let’s respond with a local consortium. 
Promotion by those private marketplaces embedded an appealing 
value proposition that provided an ideal match between advertisers’ 
requests for premium inventory bidding with incumbent producers’ 
need to target their high-end advertising inventory at premium adver-
tising buyers (LaRue, 2017b). That shift was described as a “turning 
point” by Lori Tavoularis, the managing director of revenue partnerships 
for Tribune, a leading American publishing company, who explained the 
benefit of private marketplaces: 
Prior to the construct of a private marketplace, it was very difficult 
for the buy side to identify that premium inventory they were looking 
for. Going to a private marketplace definitely increased the amount of 
conversations and business we were doing with agency trading desks 
and with agencies. (Moses, 2014) 
Incumbent producers fought back against entrant platforms to offer 
their inventory to a selected group of buyers and charge more for ads 
that appeared next to their best content (Digiday, 2017). The reason for 
incumbent producers forming and investing in those private market-
places was also highlighted by Mark Coad, CEO of PHD Media, who, 
when commenting on the reasons behind their growth, noted: 
I think in a way they have to form their own exchanges. They’ll either 
do it within their own environments or someone will do it for them, and I 
don’t see any other marketplace any differently. If you look at the stock 
exchange, I don’t go to a stock exchange to buy certain mining shares 
4 Private marketplaces required a membership card known as deal ID, a 
unique number for automated ad buying that matched buyers and sellers based 
on a pre-negotiated criterion (Morrissey, 2014). The negotiated terms could be 
the minimum bid price, section of the site, placement on the page, etc. As soon 
as those terms were agreed between the buyer and seller, the publisher created 
a deal ID through SSP and passed it manually to the buyer they had inserted 
into demand-side platforms (LaRue, 2017a). 
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and go to another one to buy my retail stocks and another one to buy my 
manufacturing stocks. There is a massive consolidation where someone 
owns the entire interface. It might be three to five years, but someone is 
going to own the exchange. (Australian Financial Review, 2015) 
The competition of incumbent producers with entrant platforms was 
a form of protection of their business models and revenue sources. The 
more intense the competition with entrant platforms, the closer was the 
cooperation to develop the private marketplaces between incumbent 
producers (see feedback-loop in phase 2, Fig. 4). Through tighter control 
on premium (high-end) inventory, producers would be able to obtain 
higher revenues per impression and secure audiences (Digiday, 2017). 
Incumbent producers, however, faced some challenges with the forma-
tion of private marketplaces, such as technology compatibility, insuffi-
cient inventory, and data leakage. They also often experienced 
integration problems between their supply-side platforms and buyers’ 
demand-side platforms which prevented the deals from happening 
(Bilton, 2014). Not surprisingly, incumbent producers described the lack 
of technology or uneven technological proficiency across parties as the 
private marketplaces’ biggest challenge. 
The private marketplace manual component, which required staff to 
fix issues and discrepancies, indicated that workflow was not fully 
efficient and automated, but rather a mix between programmatic and 
human (Digiday, 2014). An insufficient inventory problem was also 
associated with technological incompatibility. Several programmatic 
executives, such as Charlie Fiordalis of Media Storm, referred to the 
mismatching of incumbent producers’ and advertisers’ first-party data, 
or excessive data overlays on the demand- and sell-side, as causes of the 
reduced scale of available inventory: 
Sometimes there is not enough inventory for us to bid, especially 
when we run campaigns in a very short period of time. In that case, we 
need to be good friends with the publisher and say “Can you please 
prioritize our deal ID and clear our X impressions in the following three 
days?” It does take some manual work. (as quoted in Chen, 2017) 
To avoid the aforementioned challenges and compete effectively 
with entrant platforms, incumbent producers developed technological 
solutions that preserved their high-end inventory through technological 
innovation (in our setting, automation). Such marketplaces were known 
as “premium programmatic” marketplaces, also referred to as “pro-
grammatic direct” (Adweek, 2013). The mechanism that led incumbent 
producers to create premium programmatic marketplaces was the 
optimization of the audience buying process that traditional private 
marketplaces lacked. 
One of the drivers leading incumbent producers in several countries 
worldwide to coalesce and create premium programmatic marketplaces 
was the incentive to compete with the open ad exchanges created by 
disruptive entrants such as Google and Facebook. The Australian Pre-
mium Advertising Exchange (APEX), an ad exchange platform created in 
2015 by publishers Mi9 and Fairfax Media, with AppNexus as a tech-
nological partner, exemplified incumbent producers’ willingness to 
match and scale the capabilities of disruptive entrants. Similar initia-
tives involved Kiwi Premium Advertising Exchange (KPEX) in New 
Zealand and the Pangaea Alliance in the UK, whose members included 
the Financial Times, The Guardian, and Reuters. The APEX CEO described 
premium programmatic marketplaces as platforms “where advertisers 
can reach audiences programmatically in real time” giving them “the 
scale and efficiencies of an open exchange with the safety of a private 
exchange” (Chambers, 2015). One KPEX platform executive explained 
the benefits for incumbent producers of creating a premium private 
exchange: 
Publishers worldwide are wrestling with similar issues particularly in 
the face of very dominant organizations like Google and Facebook, so 
what we’ve seen in different markets worldwide is a coming together of 
traditional competitors. It [KPEX] offers the efficiency of real-time 
bidding but with the security of knowing that your brand is going to 
pop up in very trusted premium sites with brand-safe premium content. 
(The New Zealand Herald, 2015) 
However, the technical limitations and lack of expertise of incum-
bent producers were evident in this second phase. Jarrod Dicker, the 
Vice President of commercial technology and development at The 
Washington Post, noted: 
We know that not every publisher might have that expertise, or may 
not necessarily be staffed to understand what they should be doing in 
this space. We’re trying to alleviate all of that, and we’re able to tie it 
into a lot of tools that make for a seamless process. (Wodinsky, 2019) 
In sum, we highlighted that in phase 2 incumbent producers jointly 
compete with platforms to commercialize their high-end products and 
develop proprietary platforms, after noting the challenges of selective 
cooperation in phase 1 for their low-end products. We refer to the dy-
namic in phase 2 as allied competition. However, incumbent producers 
also encounter technical limitations and a lack of expertise, thereby 
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leading to the dynamics illustrated in phase 3. 
4.3. Phase 3: Selective coopetition 
In the third phase, as a new ecosystem is consolidated, incumbent 
producers start to cooperate at the component level with entrant plat-
forms which are becoming de-facto standards, as the incumbents need to 
use the new technological bottlenecks. At the same time, incumbent 
producers continue to compete with entrant platforms at the product 
level by continuing to develop producers’ proprietary platforms. We 
define the simultaneous presence of both competition and cooperation 
that characterizes phase 3 as selective coopetition. Our analysis reveals 
that incumbent producers compete at the product level (e.g., advertising 
spaces) with entrant platforms while they cooperate with them at the 
component level (e.g., technological tools) by utilizing their comple-
mentary technologies in the ecosystem. 
By around 2017, some of the entrant platforms’ superior technolo-
gies in online advertising became standard solutions in the ecosystem. 
Ad tools such as ad servers’ programmatic platforms and bad-ad de-
tectors developed by entrant platforms such as Google, OpenX, and Ad 
Lightning became central across all players engaged in digital adver-
tising. As a consequence, incumbent producers started to form part-
nerships with those component vendors. As explained by a comScore top 
100 publisher, incumbent producers had little incentive to invest in the 
creation of their own ad server: 
Could we make our own server? The rep asked. “Hell yeah”, we 
could. But it is a volatile business that I don’t want to be a part of. I’ll 
leave ad serving to Google. (Benes, 2017b) 
The role of entrant platforms (component vendors) as relevant 
partners in the ecosystem is further strengthened by their ability to 
improve quality control over incumbent producers operating on a spe-
cific exchange, as noted by John Murphy, VP of OpenX’s Marketplace 
Quality: 
We’re very strict with the kinds of publishers which operate on the 
exchange. We reject 30 to 40 per cent of the domains which apply. And 
once you’re through the door, any traffic from a publisher goes through 
our real-time traffic quality platform, which determines whether that 
traffic is real or misinterpreted (City A.M., 2016) 
Industry analysts also highlighted the increased use of ad techno-
logical components by upmarket publishers and agencies. A study by 
Industry Index of 75,000 US publishers revealed that 63% of those 
publishers were using between 51 and 150 technologies on their web-
sites, including exchanges, yield optimization tools, and supply-side 
platforms, whereas only 2% had fewer than six technologies installed 
(Shaevitz, 2018). 
Incumbent producers were found to use Google Ad Manager, an ad 
server that helped incumbent producers in yield management, with 
tasks aimed at optimizing the matching between ad buyers and sellers to 
maximize sales. Ad servers also allowed incumbent producers to sell 
inventory via private programmatic marketplace or through guaranteed 
deals which detected ad fraud (Behera, 2019). Another example of se-
lective coopetition is the use of Nativo’s ad server by more than 500 
major UK and US incumbent producers, such as The Philadelphia 
Inquirer and Tribune Publishing. Nativo’s technology presented pro-
ducers with numerous benefits, such as support across various adver-
tising formats, yield optimization through direct campaigns and open 
auctions, and data analytics. 
The increased collaboration between large Italian incumbent pro-
ducers and Google since 2017 is another example. The role of entrant 
platforms as de-facto standards was further confirmed during our 
interview with a former executive of La Repubblica’s holding company, 
GEDI Gruppo Editoriale, who noted: 
We have already entered in phase three of the evolution. After a 
period when publishers tried to develop their own private exchanges, 
now they use most of the technologies developed by these giants. 
(Anonymous executive at La Repubblica). 
Interestingly, incumbent producers maintained their competitive 
strategy against platforms at the product level by continuing to invest in 
their private programmatic marketplaces in phase 3. By developing their 
private ad exchanges, incumbent producers offered a premium in-
ventory of high-end advertising space to advertisers, thus maintaining 
control and simplifying purchasing processes for their clients while 
guaranteeing a fraud-free and transparent marketplace. In 2018, three of 
the UK’s most prominent producers, The Guardian News and Media, The 
Telegraph, and News UK, launched the Ozone Project, a programmatic 
premium platform to serve advertisers privately in a transparent and 
brand-safe manner (The Guardian, 2018). In Germany, the four biggest 
publishing houses formed an advertising alliance to create a joint 
technical infrastructure to compete with entrants’ disruptive platforms 
(Davies, 2019). A similar incumbent producer alliance, Project Nonio, 
was created by the six largest Portuguese media companies in 2017 as an 
alternative ad platform to fight the dominance of entrant platforms such 
as Google and Facebook (Southern, 2019). When talking about the 
benefits of the Pangaea Alliance, which was launched in 2015 as a single 
programmatic solution offering advertisers the ability to access in-
ventory across a group of renowned incumbent producers, Tim Gentry, 
global revenue director at The Guardian News and Media, noted: 
On our own at the Guardian we have 43 million monthly unique 
users. The alliance had a combined audience of 110 million, making it 
more comparable to high-traffic social media sites. It means we’re 
starting to knock on the doors of sites and brands like Twitter, which has 
183 million users by the same measure (quoted in the Financial Times, 
2015). 
In sum, we posit that incumbent producers in phase 3 cooperate at 
the component level with platforms by using some of their superior 
technologies in the ecosystem. At the same time, they compete at the 
product level with entrant platforms to commercialize their high-end 
products directly. We have labeled this strategy of simultaneous coop-
eration and competition at different levels as selective coopetition. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This study aimed at providing an answer to an important question: 
How do incumbent producers adapt to the rise of new platform-based eco-
systems, and how does the adaptation process evolve as an ecosystem matures 
by becoming increasingly digitalized? To respond to this question, we 
investigated the global digital advertising ecosystem (2005–2019) in 
which incumbent producers were confronted with digital entrant plat-
forms that progressively dominated the ecosystem. Given the novelty of 
the phenomenon and the relative scarcity of studies, we conducted an 
inductive longitudinal study to achieve a better theoretical under-
standing. Our findings indicate that the adaptation process by in-
cumbents is characterized by specific incumbent-challenger dynamics 
that evolve through three phases: (1) selective cooperation; (2) allied 
competition; (3) selective coopetition. Moreover, those phases pro-
gressively involve products and technological components. By building 
on our coding and empirical narrative, Fig. 4 provides a graphical rep-
resentation of the incumbents’ adaptation process to platform entrants 
in new digital ecosystems. In the following paragraph, we offer impor-
tant theoretical reflections and implications related to the three phases. 
Following Zimmermann, Raisch, & Birkinshaw (2015), we present these 
theoretical implications through formal observations, which help to 
crystalize the contribution and generalizability of our findings. 
In the early stage of the emergence of a platform-based ecosystem 
(phase 1), incumbent producers cooperate with entrant platforms (ad 
networks and ad exchanges in our setting) to commercialize in-
cumbents’ low-end products. The mechanism inducing cooperation is 
the incumbents’ desire to commercialize their less valuable and often 
remnant inventories through entrant platforms to achieve a broader 
distribution. At the same time, entrant platforms can take advantage of 
their central position in the ecosystem by not being transparent and fair 
regarding the pricing and sale of incumbent producers’ products. The 
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moral hazard (Grossman & Hart, 1992) represented by entrant platforms 
induces incumbent producers to opt for selective cooperation, whereby 
they limit their cooperation to their low-end products. We summarize 
this finding in our first observation. 
OBSERVATION 1. In the early stages of a platform-based ecosystem, 
incumbent producers cooperate with entrant platforms to commercialize their 
low-end products. As entrant platforms can take advantage of their central 
position in the ecosystem to behave opportunistically, incumbent producers 
limit their cooperation with entrants to a selective cooperation on low-end 
products only. 
In phase 2, incumbent producers are likely to change their response 
from cooperation to competition as an effect of the selective cooperation 
strategy described in phase 1. We observed that incumbent producers 
ally themselves to compete with entrant platforms in what we define as 
allied competition. The reason is that incumbent producers have already 
experienced the possible downside of cooperating with entrant plat-
forms during phase 1, and they now envision similar challenges for their 
most valuable high-end products. Therefore, incumbent producers 
collaborate among themselves to develop proprietary platforms (Coz-
zolino & Rothaermel, 2018) so as to retain their premium high-end 
products for direct commercialization—instead of relying on entrant 
platforms’ commercial solutions. That approach effectively puts those 
incumbent producers in competition with the leading entrant platforms 
in an ecosystem that would otherwise commercialize even the incum-
bent producers’ high-end products. Therefore, a differentiation strategy 
adopted by incumbent producers for their premium products (Porter, 
1980) may induce them, in the setting of emerging ecosystems, to try to 
match the offering of leading entrant platforms within it. We named the 
strategy in phase 2 allied competition. Thus, we can expect that: 
OBSERVATION 2. To avoid the moral hazard and opportunism experi-
enced in their low-end market during collaboration with entrant platforms, 
incumbent producers collaborate between themselves to commercialize their 
high-end products. Such new cooperation helps incumbents to develop pro-
prietary platforms for their high-end products, rather than using entrant 
platforms’ solutions. 
In phase 3, incumbent producers need to adopt the entrant plat-
forms’ technological components that have become industry standards 
and/or bottlenecks in the (now mature) ecosystem (Hannah & Eisen-
hardt, 2018). Therefore, incumbent producers are forced to cooperate at 
the component level with entrant platforms by using their technologies. 
At the same time, incumbent producers in phase 3 continue to compete 
at the product level with entrant platforms by developing their own 
platforms to commercialize their high-end products directly. Thus, we 
expect the following: 
OBSERVATION 3. When a platform-based ecosystem matures, incum-
bent producers are more likely to accept cooperation with new entrant plat-
forms that control a technological component of the ecosystem, but they still 
compete with entrant platforms at the product level for proprietary 
commercialization of their high-end products. 
5.1. Theoretical implications 
The major contribution of the study relates to advancing a novel 
process model depicting the changes in cooperative and competitive 
strategies over time between incumbent producers and entrant plat-
forms during the formation of a digital, platform-based ecosystem. The 
process model contributes to multiple literatures, including incumbent 
adaptation, platform-based ecosystems, competition and cooperation, 
and business models. 
5.1.1. Incumbent adaptation to platform-based ecosystems 
Our findings expand the incumbent adaptation literature, which has 
traditionally focused on non-platform-based technological changes (e.g., 
cement, airlines, computers, photography, drugs) (Christensen, 1997; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Sosa, 2011; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Although that literature has been fruitful in explaining incumbents’ 
failures (e.g., Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), reaction strategies (e.g., O’Reilly 
& Tushman, 2008), and incumbent-entrant dynamics (e.g., Christensen 
& Bower, 1996), some of its findings need to be integrated when 
considering disruptions from platform-based ecosystems. For instance, 
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation indicates that incumbents 
ignore entrant competition in the lower-end market. We integrate that 
finding by showing that incumbents do not always ignore entrants at the 
low-end but rather can collaborate with them for commercialization 
purposes when entrants are platforms in a new ecosystem. Our model 
suggests that incumbent producers compete with entrant platforms only 
in a later phase when they envision a potential attack on their high-end 
market. Moreover, the reaction strategy is different from the type of 
cooperation seen in most incumbent adaptation studies. In contrast to 
some common evidence of vertical cooperation between incumbents 
and entrants (e.g., Pisano, 1990), we found that incumbent adaptation to 
digital platforms may require cooperation between incumbents against 
entrants (allied competition). 
Our empirical evidence corroborates a recent theoretical tenet 
advanced by Cozzolino and Rothaermel (2018), according to whom 
incumbents cooperate among themselves when they all face 
complementary-asset discontinuities. Our contribution complements 
those authors’ work by showing that incumbent producers cooperate to 
avoid the propagation of entrant platform challenges from “low-end” to 
“high-end” products. Therefore, our addition is the key dimension of 
low-end versus high-end products in explaining such dynamics. We 
posit, in fact, that segmenting the market may provide insights into 
competitive dynamics that were not previously considered. 
Finally, our process model provides a multi-level appreciation of 
competitive dynamics in platform ecosystems: (1) high-end versus low- 
end products, but also (2) products versus technological components (as 
seen in phase 3). That is a novel and compelling contribution as, to date, 
the literature on incumbent adaptation has rarely described multi-level 
dynamic responses. A recent exception is Ozcan and Hannah (2020), 
who examined the online advertising industry, but from the perspective 
of advertising agencies dealing with digital suppliers. While they found 
that advertising agencies needed to reconfigure their supplier ecosys-
tems to incorporate new disruptive technologies, our contribution pro-
vides an appreciation of cooperation and competition processes at 
different levels, through which incumbents can fit into a new platform- 
based ecosystem. 
5.1.2. Platform ecosystems, competition, and cooperation 
This paper also contributes to the platform ecosystems literature (e. 
g., Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Snihur, Thomas, & Burgelman, 2018; 
Tiwana et al., 2010) and related competition and cooperation studies (e. 
g., Bacon, Williams, & Davies, 2019; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Padula & 
Dagnino, 2007). A central argument of the platform ecosystems litera-
ture is that technological evolution in interdependency situations stim-
ulates competition and cooperation (Gawer, 2014; Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2018), and that platform owners need to balance their 
business and technological decisions not to discourage complementors 
(Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018; Zhu & Liu, 2018). We also found that in 
the specific case of incumbent producers adapting to a new ecosystem it 
is necessary to control some technological components on which to 
compete while allowing complementors to develop components that 
enhance ecosystem functionality. For instance, our model reveals that 
incumbent producers can jointly control some proprietary platforms 
(through allied cooperation) but then use the new bottleneck compo-
nents of the ecosystem (through selective coopetition). Our study 
characterizes those dynamics, which are important for the platform 
literature (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018), by 
adopting the unique perspective of incumbent producers. Our data 
reveal that a multi-level and temporal approach of three different 
competition and cooperation strategies can be necessary for an incum-
bent producer to balance the positive and negative interdependencies 
with an ecosystem’s key actors. This finding extends previous studies in 
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the coopetition literature that focused on the intertemporal variance of 
firms’ relational ties (e.g., from competition to cooperation to coopeti-
tion) while keeping the roles (e.g., producers, platform owners) stable 
(e.g., Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018). In fact, we 
tracked variations of competitive roles (e.g., incumbent producers also 
becoming joint platform owners), relationships, and business models (i. 
e., brick-and-mortar versus digital). 
The characterization of the three strategies is another main contri-
bution of this study. The observed response by incumbent producers to 
entrant platforms’ opportunistic behavior was named selective cooper-
ation. We show that incumbents can limit the cooperation to only their 
less valuable low-end products when platforms abuse their orchestrating 
position in an ecosystem (Parida et al., 2019). That selective cooperation 
strategy contributes to the discourse on the instability of alliances (e.g., 
Das & Teng, 2000) and to a more fine-grained understanding of coop-
eration between firms. 
The allied competition strategy adds theoretical nuance related to 
the commercialization of high-end products by incumbents in platform- 
based ecosystems. Further, the selective coopetition finding is an 
ecosystem strategy that prior research has not fully unpacked. While 
scholars have recently observed the need to turn to “coopetition” over 
time after the downsides of cooperation and competition alone become 
apparent (Ansari et al., 2016), our contribution characterizes the 
product and component levels at which coopetition takes place. These 
findings also integrate current evidence on the role of bottlenecks 
(Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2018) and components (Adner, 2012) in 
ecosystems. 
5.1.3. Platforms and business models 
This paper also contributes to the conversation on business model 
innovation (Corbo, 2017; Foss & Saebi, 2017) by providing a detailed 
process explaining the nuanced phases through which incumbents can 
adapt their business models to a new ecosystem (e.g., Cozzolino et al., 
2018). In our empirical context, we examined media publishers that 
traditionally used a multi-sided markets business model, which is 
effectively equivalent to platforms, insofar as they engage with multiple 
customer groups and monetize their interactions (Nucciarelli et al., 
2017). Business model literature has specifically called for a better un-
derstanding of business models and technological innovation as distinct 
yet related drivers of competitive advantage (Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 
2013). Empirically, to identify whether competition and performance 
are driven by technology or business model choices, one should keep one 
aspect constant and examine variance in the other. In our setting, as both 
incumbents (content producers) and new entrants (advertising plat-
forms) rely on multi-sided business models, we were able to focus on the 
technological implications for competition. 
Prior research has addressed cases where companies, particularly 
digital-born new entrants, cater to different customer segments in a 
business model portfolio (e.g., Ahuja & Novelli, 2016; Aversa, Haefliger, 
& Reza, 2017; Aversa & Guillotin, 2018). Through business model ser-
vitization (Visnjic, Wiengarten, & Neely, 2016), for instance, firms 
engage with several customer groups. In more recent work, Aversa et al. 
(2020) show how Amazon’s business model portfolio disrupted tradi-
tional retailers by delivering a set of services through the same website. 
Our work complements that emerging stream of research by suggesting 
two noteworthy points. First, we extend recent studies on business 
model adaptation (e.g., Cozzolino et al., 2018) by showing that digital 
transformation allows incumbents to diversify their traditional, servi-
tized business model for premium customers by adding an automated 
digital business model for lower-end customers. Second, we contribute 
to the emerging literature on digital transformation (Cennamo, Dagnino, 
Di Minin, & Lanzolla, 2020) by showing how increasing the engagement 
with digital technologies sets organizations on transformational paths, 
which might further develop the incumbents’ business model, for 
example, by connecting them to an ecosystem of different actors, where 
their portfolio needs to be integrated with those of key 
complementors—such as the entrant platforms—which are competitors 
within other segments. 
5.2. Implications for practice 
Our findings have noteworthy implications for incumbent producers’ 
strategies in response to entrant platforms shaping new business eco-
systems. Our three-phased process framework can help the managers of 
incumbent firms to form a better assessment of the appropriate timing of 
their choices with respect to the trade-off between cooperation and 
competition with challenging entrants. In doing so, incumbents can reap 
the benefits of cooperating with entrant platforms on their lower-end 
products (i.e., the long tail), as long as they are able to protect and 
preserve control over their high-end products. If their premium offering 
is threatened by entrant platforms, as is likely as entrants acquire more 
industry knowledge and consolidate their position over time, in-
cumbents may coalesce and compete by developing their own platform 
solutions. That is the case with the Pangaea Alliance, whose members 
include core industry players such as the Financial Times, The Guardian, 
and Reuters. Incumbent producers may eventually opt for a hybrid 
strategy by competing with entrant platforms at the product level, while 
cooperating with them on the technological level by using some of their 
technological components which have become standard in the 
ecosystem. 
Our findings are generalizable beyond the advertising industry. 
Indeed, similar patterns can be observed in industries as diverse as 
financial services and the automotive industry. For instance, Klarna, a 
new entrant platform in the financial services industry, introduced on-
line payment solutions that allowed customers to pay later or divide the 
payments into monthly installments (Parmy, 2018). Despite high 
transaction charges to merchants of between 3% and 4%, financial 
services companies (e.g., Mastercard) and merchants worked with 
Klarna due to the limited risk of fraudulent transactions and the 
advantage of accessing multiple payment methods. As Klarna gained 
popularity, financial services companies started thinking about the loss 
of transaction fees through Klarna facilitating the payments and began 
offering similar payment solutions, such as improved checkout and 
fraud prevention, and created new mobile solutions, such as Apple Pay. 
However, since Klarna’s smart payment solution was widely adopted by 
both merchants and customers, financial services companies decided to 
work with Klarna for enhanced payment options while continuing to 
develop their own payment solutions to get a larger share of digital 
banking. 
Another example that resonates with this study’s findings is the 
producer of electric vehicles Tesla, which created the Roadster model by 
partnering with Lotus, Siemens, and additional manufacturers to gain 
access to the chassis and components needed to produce the vehicle. 
Once the Roadster had gained significant attention due to its electric 
engine and mileage capability, giant car makers terminated their sup-
port by developing their own electric vehicles, such as Daimler’s Smart 
and Chevrolet’s Colt, to capture the electric vehicles market. However, 
those corporations realized that they lacked the capabilities to develop a 
battery pack capable of providing significant mileage (arguably one of 
the most critical technological bottlenecks) and partnered with Tesla to 
supply batteries while creating their own vehicles (Davis, 2010). In both 
the aforementioned examples, disruptors depended in the early stages 
on the incumbents, which in turn benefited from the disruptors’ in-
novations. Over time, alliances were terminated, but then cooperation 
was restored over components that became standards or bottlenecks 
while competition was maintained at the product level. 
Such cases suggest to executives that, despite engaging in different 
industries, our insights point to widespread patterns of competition 
among firms’ business models. Hence, the evidence suggests that 
reflecting on how embracing technological innovation—and in partic-
ular digital transformation—can trigger not only opportunities for the 
firm but also competitive responses by other players. Our insights on 
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digital transformation in platform ecosystems further suggest two 
important reflections for practitioners. On the one hand, the advent of 
digital technologies equips new entrants with the opportunity to develop 
valuable capabilities quickly to compete with established competitors, 
and we warn incumbents from under-estimating how rapidly such new 
players can reach market-dominant positions. On the other hand, the 
multi-sided nature of platforms requires firms to cater to multiple 
customer groups at the same time—a challenging task that might require 
superior customer knowledge. That might provide incumbents with an 
opportunity to develop relational capabilities to co-create value in those 
market segments which are not yet suited for a purely digital engage-
ment (in our case, the higher segments of the market), and deploy 
temporary strategies to cope with competing new entrants, while 
implementing the transition to a fully-digital engagement. 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
As with any study, our work has limitations that also offer oppor-
tunities for future research. First, we acknowledge that our setting 
presents specific patterns and boundary conditions, such as the advent of 
advanced digital entrants facing traditional, long-standing, and highly 
institutionalized incumbents, in a market where competition has 
become technology-driven. Careful consideration is required therefore 
when generalizing our findings to other industries, which might differ in 
their boundary conditions and underlying assumptions. Further, 
research may identify additional incumbent strategies in reaction to 
entrant platforms in settings that present characteristics that diverge 
from ours by exploring contexts embracing ecosystem logics, such as 
manufacturing and service industries, knowledge-intensive, and capital- 
intensive businesses following the digitalization process brought by the 
Internet, and through Industry 4.0 technologies (e.g., blockchain, 
Internet of Things—see Aversa, Formentini, Iubatti, & Lorenzoni, 2020). 
Future studies may also test the validity of our results in settings where 
changes in collaborative behavior may be caused by the non- 
technological shifts resulting from major exogenous shocks such as 
pandemics or terrorist attacks (Arslan & Tarakci, 2020; Corbo, Corrado, 
& Ferriani, 2016). 
Future studies may explore whether the dynamics depicted in our 
three-stage process can be found in contexts where there is a significant 
preference toward cooperation over competition, such as in the case of 
Internet of Things smart city alliances (e.g., Bresciani, Ferraris, & Del 
Giudice, 2018), where competition would be detrimental to both in-
cumbents and entrants. Interesting results might also stem from the 
assessment of the type of cooperative forms adopted by incumbents, for 
instance, by distinguishing between formal collaboration models such as 
alliances and licensing-in versus informal collaboration models 
involving sourcing knowledge from suppliers or competitors based on 
non-contractual relationships (Santoro, Bresciani, & Papa, 2020). 
Our study is exploratory in nature and the incumbents’ strategies we 
identified are worth further investigation. We have suggested that the 
choice between cooperating or competing with entrant platforms largely 
depends on frictions created between incumbents and challenging en-
trants, and the competitive pressure exerted by the latter. Such decisions 
may also be influenced by the nature of competition itself (i.e., whether 
it is based on technology, product, or both), thereby leading to different 
incumbent responses. The coopetitive dynamics described in the process 
model we developed illustrate the progressive digitalization of an 
ecosystem. That process, however, may be influenced to a certain extent 
by specific industry players acting either as gatekeepers or as facilitators 
of the ecosystem’s digitalization. In traditional industry settings such as 
manufacturing, it has been suggested that ecosystem transformation is 
achieved through a process of orchestration of ecosystem partners 
conducted by industry players acting as ecosystem leaders or orches-
trators (Parida et al., 2019). Similar patterns have also been suggested in 
less conventional settings such as crowdfunding platforms in which 
specific actors (core agents) may assume the role of crowdfunding 
campaign orchestrators assigning specific tasks to peripheral agents and 
using the crowdfunding campaign results to influence ecosystem evo-
lution (Nucciarelli et al., 2017). Within an ecosystem, diverse roles such 
as keystone, dominant, and niche players (Iansiti & Levien, 2004) can be 
assumed which promise to have a relevant impact in shaping coopera-
tive and competitive ecosystem dynamics. Future research can shed 
more light on this important issue. 
Finally, our work depicts a typical process of digital transformation 
in a sector where traditional incumbents grapple with the technological 
challenges introduced by new entrants. As a matter of fact, digitalization 
has already pervaded most industries, and we will soon be facing situ-
ations where both incumbents and new entrants present advanced dig-
ital infrastructures and capabilities. The industry boundaries which 
characterized market competition until recent times will shift to 
ecosystem-like arrangements, where value will be created and captured 
by engaging with a more heterogeneous set of players than what tradi-
tional tenets in strategic management have long assumed. In such cases, 
the ability to orchestrate competition and cooperation strategically 
across market segments, technologies, and customer groups will likely 
become a distinctive factor in firms’ competitive advantages. Our un-
derstanding of how to create and sustain such a capability is far from 
being complete, and we hope our study will serve as a stepping stone for 
those scholars who will engage with this compelling topic and its open 
questions. 
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